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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the role of ‘systems of beliefs’ and disciplinary and professional norms 
and culture as a potential source of conflicts of interest in decision-making by professionals. 
In particular it argues that ‘intellectual’ views and professional values and agendas, may 
represent a potent source of potential conflicts of interest, which may not be readily recog-
nised or fully understood across diverse disciplinary or professional settings, because of dif-
fering disciplinary/professional world-views, training and priorities. The article argues that 
there is a need for more open and honest cross-disciplinary conversations about how conflicts 
of interest are constructed and navigated in different scholarly and professional contexts. 
This is key to unmasking potential conflicts of interest that may unconsciously be sourced 
by particular intellectual views, positions and systems of beliefs, particularly when they are 
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such as university human research ethics committees and other cross-disciplinary institu-
tional or organisational (corporate and non-corporate) decision-making or review bodies, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
As Chair and member of an institutional Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) 
I’m regularly provoked to think about potential conflicts of interest (COI) that might 
arise and impact on the research that is the subject of the HREC’s review, as well as the 
potential COI that may arise in the ethical review process itself. An HREC is composed 
of a number of members from a wide range of professional, cultural and social back-
grounds.2 Some recent discussions around my HREC table have highlighted for me just 
how diverse committee members’ understandings can be, of what constitutes a conflict 
of interest, and how potential COI may not even be considered relevant, due to a person’s 
worldview or how they perceive and situate themselves politically, intellectually or pro-
fessionally. Increasingly I have been alerted to how particular disciplinary backgrounds 
and professional training might influence people’s assessment of whether a potential con-
flict of interest might be enlivened, its nature and its likely impact on decision-making. In 
particular, I have started to think about possible differences between the scientific and 
medical profession’s conception of COI, and that of other disciplines and professions, 
such as the legal profession. And whether, such differences matter, and if so, how and 
why? 
 
Against this backdrop, this article seeks to explore how COI are perceived, constructed 
and prioritised in different disciplinary and professional settings. This is an important 
discussion for institutional ethics committees and other similar boards and organisational 
bodies which are constituted by a diverse professional and lay membership (whether in a 
corporate, governmental or academic context) and whose core activities and decision-
making involve identifying and thinking about the impact of potential conflicts of inter-
est. 
 
The purpose of this article is to highlight and remind us that potential COI may be inter-
preted and viewed in different ways by people from diverse backgrounds, and perhaps, 
that in certain settings, a more explicit discussion needs to occur around potential COI, 
so as to ensure that everyone is on the same page and that decisions are being made in an 
open and transparent way, and with common understanding. Sometimes, as decision-
makers, we have to be prepared and equipped to more readily step outside our own 
worldview or professional lens, in order to honestly and genuinely engage with potential 
COI, and thereby avoid introducing unconscious bias and unfairness into our decisions, 
even if (and perhaps especially if) we are convinced that what we, or others are doing, is 
for the better ‘good’. 





  Most institutional ethical review committees mandate inclusion of clinicians, lawyers, laypeople, pastors or 
spiritual leaders, and researchers. 
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As a point of departure we need to, at least generally, ask, what we understand as consti-
tuting a ‘conflict of interest’. COI (also referred to as ‘competing interests’, ‘dual commit-
ments’, and ‘dual loyalties’) describe circumstances in which a primary interest (matters 
of professional judgment) may be at risk of undue influence by secondary interests.3 Al-
ternatively, conflicts of interest can be framed as “a structure that carries an invitation”: 
 
The structure is comprised of (1) a relationship featuring a strong obligation 
based on trust – for professions, a loyalty in which the provider places the bene-
ficiary’s interests above his or her own interests, and (2) an opportunity to act 
contrary to that obligation. The invitation arises when such an opportunity is 
sufficiently attractive that it poses a significant temptation to override the obli-
gation.4 
 
The distinction between primary and secondary interests is drawn by separating the re-
quirements and obligations of an entity’s (individual or group) particular professional 
activity or role (e.g. duties to clients and patients, conducting or reviewing research) from 
‘external’ interests that are referable solely to their private benefit, involvement in other 
activities or their existing relationships.5 These secondary interests can broadly be catego-
rised as either being “financial” or “nonfinancial” in nature.  
 
Financial COI can take a myriad of forms and may include: research grants and contracts; 
consultancies; employment opportunities; positions on committees and boards; stock 
ownership or options; honoraria; intellectual property (including patents, royalties, and 
licensing fees); paid expert testimony; and participation in speakers’ bureaus or other pro-
fessional forums or honours.  
 
Non-financial COI (NFCOI) are more difficult to characterise. Most definitions of 
NFCOI describe such conflicts in the negative -encompassing all undue secondary inter-
ests that are not financial.6 The three most commonly identified NFCOI, which are of 




  Pascal Probst et al., Thirty Years of Disclosure of Conflict of Interest in Surgery Journals, 157, SURGERY 627, 
627 (2015); INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF MEDICAL JOURNAL EDITORS (ICMJE), RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR THE CONDUCT OF REPORTING, EDITING AND PUBLICATION OF SCHOLARLY WORK IN MEDICAL 
JOURNALS (2016); Bernard Lo & Marilyn J Field, Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, EDUCATION, AND 
PRACTICE (National Academies Press, 2009), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK22942/. 
4
  E Haavi Morreim, Taking a Lesson from the Lawyers: Defining and Addressing Conflict of Interest, 11 AMER-
ICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS 33 (2011). 
5
  Probst et al., supra at 627. 
6
  Richard S Saver, Is It Really All About the Money? Reconsidering Non-Financial Interests in Medical Re-
search, 40 JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS 467,468 (2012); Meera Viswanathan et al., A Proposed 
Approach May Help Systematic Reviews Retain Needed Expertise While Minimizing Bias from Nonfinancial 
Conflicts of Interest, 67 JOURNAL OF CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 1229, 1231 (2014). 
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personal relationships. 7 
 
Systems of belief, as a source of conflict, can be pervasive, encompassing intellectual, po-
litical, religious or professional beliefs, and may unwittingly result in bias in decision-mak-
ing. ‘Intellectual’ COI refer to academic or scholarly “activities that create the potential 
for attachment to a specific point of view that could unduly influence an individual’s 
judgement about a specific”8 matter or recommendation. For researchers, it has been sug-
gested that “preset beliefs in the likely outcome or a sincere conviction that a particular 
result is correct are more potent confounders of unbiased observation than financial in-
terests” because of their potential to influence the entire research process, and especially 
the interpretation of evidence or data.9 Similarly, researchers may possess “ambition to 
advance … knowledge, investigative zeal, and intellectual passion” that might “undermine 
investigator objectivity and subject protection”.10 Such ‘intellectual’ COI may arise in 
many other academic or professional contexts beyond that of the ‘researcher’. For exam-
ple, it may apply to health or medical professionals involved in new cutting-edge thera-
pies, lawyers pursuing justice for the disadvantaged or oppressed; indeed in any profes-
sional context where those involved may unquestioningly assume and pursue the benefi-
cence of their activities. In the context of an institutional ethics committee or other similar 
review or organisational committee, the power of such intellectual COI may be amplified 
by the group membership and the collective force of the group’s convictions. Members 
of an HREC, for example, are often deeply committed and passionate about the ethical 
conduct of research. Their perception and strong belief in the beneficence of ethical re-
view and the legitimacy of the ethical review process, creates a particular intellectual prism 
through which decisions are made. This may unconsciously obscure and entrench poten-
tial conflicts of interest around the table, and influence the committee’s deliberations and 
decision-making, perhaps through a strengthened collective conviction over time, as the 
group’s identity and ideological unity is fortified. 
 
Professional objectives (which are not unnecessarily unrelated to ‘systems of beliefs’) may 




  ICMJE, supra at 3; Lo and Field, supra; Claire Johnson, Conflict of Interest in Scientific Publications: A Histor-
ical Review and Update, 33 JOURNAL OF MANIPULATIVE AND PHYSIOLOGICAL THERAPEU-
TICS 81 (2010); Ravi P Mahajan, Conflicts of Interest in Medical Journals, 41 COLOMBIAN JOURNAL OF 
ANESTHESIOLOGY 179 (2013). 
8
  David Lau, Addressing Conflict of Interest and Bias in Research, Education and Clinical Practice, 39 CANA-
DIAN JOURNAL OF DIABETES 247, 248 (2015); Khaled Shawwa et al., Requirements of Clinical Journals for 
Authors’ Disclosure of Financial and Non-Financial Conflicts of Interest: A Cross Sectional Study, 11 PLoS 
ONE 1 (2016); Elie A Akl et al., Considering Intellectual, in Addition to Financial, Conflicts of Interest Proved 
Important in a Clinical Practice Guideline: A Descriptive Study, 67 JOURNAL OF CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 
1222 (2014).; see also Saver 2012, supra at 468, Viswanathan et al., supra at 1232. 
9
  Ross E McKinney Jr & Heather H Pierce, Strategies for Addressing a Broader Definition of Conflicts of Inter-
est, 317 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 1727, 1727 (2017). 
10
  Saver, supra at 468. 
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ary interests and motivations, including career advancement (both for tenure and promo-
tion), and recognition from peers (including honours and prestige) which take on a par-
ticular significance or importance in a particular disciplinary or professional context.11 
Professional drivers and established indicia or ‘models’ of success within a professional 
group may be a strong influencing force and source of COI. Such may be imbued in pro-
fessional identity and notions of professional ‘success’ right from the beginning of their 
university study and training and thereafter reinforced through professional milestones 
and culture.12 
 
Likewise personal relationships with the potential to influence professional behaviours or 
judgments and decisions can source a conflict of interest.13 Relationships with institutions 
and other professional entities for example, may also have the potential to conflict with 
primary interests.14 One area of growing attention is the ever expanding development of 
partnerships between organisations and institutions with corporate sponsors and fun-
ders, and the potential impact of such in normalising the ‘demands of the market’ and 
‘commercial interests’ at the institutional or organisational level and thereby perhaps ob-
scuring potential COI.15 
 
Such potential COI grounded in professional objectives, institutional or organisational 
membership and roles, and personal or professional relationships are relevant to decisions 
or ‘choices’ made by researchers and other professionals in their professional and related 
activities. They may also, for example, play out in the decisions of HREC’s and other sim-
ilar committees or bodies that are charged with institutional or organisational related de-
cisions. It may be difficult for such committees and bodies to readily appreciate how such 
specific potential conflicts of interest are manifesting for particular members, when the 
membership is varied, and to unpack these around the table. This is because some of these 
potential sources of COI may not be readily ‘visible’ or appreciated by all members who 
work outside the institution or organisation, or for those who have a different disciplinary 
or professional lens or focus, or are situated within a specific institutional or organisa-
tional quarter and are influenced by that particular (potentially insular) world view and 
understanding, and so are unable to identify even the need to interrogate the probity of 
such broader influences. Those within a particular profession on the other hand, may be 
blind to the impact of such influences on their own thinking and decision-making, be-




  Id. at 468; Viswanathan et al., supra at 1232. 
12
  Cruess et al., A Schematic Representation of the Professional Identity Formation and Socialization of Medical 
Students and Residents: A Guide for Medical Educators, 90 ACADEMIC MEDICINE 718 (2015); Christine 
Cerniglia Brown, Professional Identity Formation: Working Backwards to Move the Profession Forward, 61 
LOYOLA LAW REVIEW 313, 320 (2015). 
13
  Viswanathan et al., supra at 1232. 
14
  Arthur L Caplan, Is Industry Money the Root of All Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research?, 59 ANNALS 
OF EMERGENCY MEDICINE 87 (2012); Id. at 1232. 
15
  Christopher Mayes et al., Conflicts of Interest in Neoliberal times: Perspectives of Australian Medical Students, 
25 HEALTH SOCIOLOGY REVIEW 256 (2016). 
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identity that they are simply not ever brought into question. Furthermore the dominance 
of particular disciplines or professionals in some professional settings or on committees 
or in boardrooms may further serve to silence ‘outsider’ or ‘marginal’ voices and render 
such potential conflicts of interest even more opaque; preventing them from being scru-
tinised and unmasked. 
III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND HUMAN RESEARCH 
 
Codes on ethical conduct in human research generally explicitly address and eschew con-
flicts of interest. For example, the Australian National Health and Medical Research 
Council (NHMRC) National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research 2007 
requires that institutions “establish transparent processes to identify and manage actual 
and potential conflicts of interest involving: a. the institution itself; b. researchers; or c. 
ethical review bodies, their members or advisors.”16 Statements of this kind address the 
vital policy objective of building public trust in the human research ethical review process 
which as a broad-based objective, includes four specific goals: 
 
1. To protect the rights and welfare of human participants; 
2. To promote social justice, especially in ensuring equitable subject  
selection and a fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of research;  
3. To produce results that benefit society, especially in public health 
research;  
4. To foster public trust in both the methods and results of research, in 
order to ensure funding and the recruitment of future subjects.17 
 
If the full spectrum of potential COI are not recognised and carefully considered in ethical 
or other like review processes, they can impact and indeed compromise not only research 
processes but the ethical or other review processes themselves, and ultimately such im-
portant public policy interests and objectives. Potential conflicts of interest can impact 
every stage of research from the choice of research topic (“to choose a topic of research 
that has the potential for better funding or other financial benefits”), study design, data 
analysis and interpretation, through to data reporting and dissemination of findings.18 
 
While many consequences of COI on research may be unintended or even perhaps un-
conscious, the pursuit of secondary interests, to the detriment of research integrity, has 
been observed and is well recorded. Berger, for example, refers to ‘selective inertia’ (“an 
unnatural selection of research methods based on which are most likely to establish the 




  Section 5.4.1. 
17
  David B Resnik, Public Trust as a Policy Goal for Research with Human Subjects, 10 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
BIOETHICS 15, 16 (2010). 
18
  Lindsay Hampson & James Montie, Conflict of Interest in Urology, 187 JOURNAL OF UROLOGY 1971, 1974. 
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which researchers can consciously sway their research results in a biased or flawed way.19 
Other research has discovered active efforts on the part of researchers to alter or suppress 
data. For example, Martinson et al. and Carragee et al. reported that industry influence or 
funding led to pressure to suppress or underreport negative data.20 Additionally, Martin-
son et al in a 2005 US federally-sponsored survey of 3,000 academic scientists, found that 
15% of them admitted to altering study design or results based on pressure stemming from 
an external funding source. Conversely, it has been suggested that perhaps “the disclosure 
of conflicts of interest may exacerbate biases in the presentation of research by creating 
the impetus to compensate for the disclosure”21 creating a reverse bias in presentation of 
findings against sponsor interest. Either way, such COI are potentially biasing research 
processes and its outcomes. 
 
A. A Medical Research 
 
The pre-eminence of considerations of COI in medical research has been primarily con-
nected to the growing dependence of research on the financial contributions of industry 
(see, e.g., Brody, 2011), whether directly from a corporation itself or through organisations 
and government agencies that work with industry to promote particular devices or phar-
maceuticals.22 References to a “medical-industrial complex” date back to the 1980s; and it 
has been suggested that presence of an industry sponsor (especially one whose medical 
intervention is the subject of the research) is “the factor most likely to exert an inappro-
priate influence on investigator professionalism”.23 Strikingly today, two-thirds of bio-
medical research globally is supported by industry. Studies have also begun to investigate 
suggestions that the larger the size of financial incentives, the greater the COI concerns.24 
 
Moreover, the ability to conduct human research in medical fields relies on the ability to 




  Vance W Berger, Conflicts of Interest, Selective Inertia, and Research Malpractice in Randomized Clinical 
Trials: An Unholy Trinity, 21 SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS 857, 857 (2015). 
20
  Brian Martinson et al., Scientists Behaving Badly, 435 NATURE 737 (2005); Eugene Carragee et al., A Critical 
Review of Recombinant Human Bone Morphogenetic Protein-2 Trials in Spinal Surgery: Emerging Safety Con-
cerns and Lessons Learned, 11 The SPINE JOURNAL 471 (2011). 
21
  AG Dunn et al., Conflict of Interest Disclosure in Biomedical Research: A Review of Current Practices, Biases, 
and the Role of Public Registries in Improving Transparency, 1 RESEARCH INTEGRITY AND PEER REVIEW 1, 2 
(2016). 
22  J Diels et al., Association of Financial or Professional Conflict of Interest to Research Outcomes on Health Risks 
or Nutritional Assessment Studies of Genetically Modified Products, 36 FOOD POLICY 197, 198 (2011). 
23  Probst et al., supra at 627; Dunn et al., supra at 1. 
24  Justin Chakma et al., Asia’s Ascent – Global Trends in Biomedical R&D Expenditures, 370, NEW ENGLAND 
JOURNAL OF MEDICINE 3, 3-6 (2014); see Bernard Lo & Deborah Grady, Payments to Physicians: Does the 
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development in particular, there has been increasing demand and competition for sub-
jects due to “the spectacular increase in research activity over the last two decades, an in-
crease in large part driven by growing commercial interests in research”.25 This is an area 
which has become rife with the influence of FCOIs. To attract referrals, industry engages 
in practices such as offering substantial payments to researchers and clinicians for refer-
rals, invitations to make well-paid presentations of research findings or to participate in 
prestigious seminars, the appointment of researchers to lucrative positions on sponsors’ 
scientific advisory boards and specialised committees, and paid consulting relationships.26 
In some industry-sponsored trials, there have even been reports of companies determin-
ing the authorship of study results on the basis of physicians’ patient enrolment figures.27 
 
In the US, the seeming ubiquity of this issue in the medical profession has even produced 
legislative intervention specifically targeting the profession and its industrial affiliates. 
The Physical Payments Sunshine Act (PPSA), signed into law in 2010 as part of the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act, requires pharmaceutical, medical device, bio-
logical, and medical supply manufacturers to report to the Department of Health and 
Human Services any payments to physicians and teaching hospitals that exceed US$10; 
the payments are then made a matter of public record via a database.28 Proposals have also 
been made to devise methods for operationalising FCOIs, especially in the scientific and 
medical communities, including through “FCOI scales” that express the nature and ex-
tent of FCOIs on research, with a numerical score correlating to descriptive terms for po-
tential biases and sample conflicts.29  
 
The presence of COIs in human research, especially FCOIs, may exert an influence over 
the process and results of the research. This influence may be subtle; researchers “might 
become more lenient with respect to informed consent procedures, they may convince 
themselves that research participation is in their patient’s best interests, or they may be 
overly flexible with regard to the study inclusion and exclusion criteria”.30 In more meas-
urable terms, there have been extensive academic attempts to measure the potential influ-
ence of COI on the results of medical and dental research (predominant clinical trials) 
	
		
25  TRUDO LEMMENS & PAUL B MILLER, THE HUMAN SUBJECTS TRADE: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND REGULA-
TORY REMEDIES TO DEAL WITH RECRUITMENT INCENTIVES AND TO PROTECT SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY 
LAW AND ETHICS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, 135-136 (Trudo Lemmens & Duff Waring, 2017). 
26  Id. at 135. 
27  Id. at 141. 
28  For further background, see Susan Chimonas, Frederica Stahl & David J Rothman, Exposing Conflicts of In-
terest in Psychiatry: Does Transparency Matter?, 35 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 
490 (2012); Susan L Norris et al., Characteristics of Physicians Receiving Large Payments from Pharmaceutical 
Companies and the Accuracy of Their Disclosures in Publications: An Observational Study, 13 BMC MEDICAL 
ETHICS 24, 25 (2012). 
29  S V M Maharaj, A New Method for Scoring Financial Conflicts of Interest, 21(1) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 
OF OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 49 (2015). 
30  Supra at 139. 
	
	
COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 3   NUMBER 2   2017 
RITA SHACKEL  |  THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL BELIEFS AND PROFESSIONAL CULTURE AS A SOURCE OF POTENTIAL 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
 
PAGE  44 
involving human subjects. The overwhelming, but not universal, consensus appears to be 
that the presence of COI, whether financial or non-financial and whether disclosed or not 
disclosed, are linked with the particular outcomes being measured.31 
 
B. Non-medical Research 
 
Despite a dominance of research into COI related to medical and health research, COI 
concerns have arisen, and are increasingly being discussed also in other disciplinary con-
texts. In the humanities and social sciences, research involving community-based partici-
pation can be affected by ‘partnership tensions’, both as a financial and nonfinancial 
source of conflict. Just as industry sponsors may have an influence on study design for 
medical studies, pressure from institutional partners may result, for example, in the ex-
pulsion of particular community participants in order to ensure the ‘success’ of the re-
search:  
 
Given the centrality of community participation to CBPR, deliberate expulsion and ex-
clusion of community participants would not be a decision taken lightly and might be 
influenced by the researcher’s perception of risk of non-compliance (with requirements 
of funding bodies, universities, service providers or government). We highlight the ethical 
challenge for researchers faced with institutional conflicts of interest who make the deci-
sion to exclude community members from CBPR for ‘institutional self-protection’. To 
remain faithful to the emancipatory empowering paradigm would mean to avoid falling 
back on traditional conceptions of research and tokenistic participation when principles 
of CBPR, including community empowerment, threaten research success. Silencing can 
itself be detrimental to research results and interventions by missing the “authentic com-
munity voice”.32  
 
Other potential conflicts of interest may arise when professionals assume multiple roles 
in ‘social’ based research, for example, increasingly in higher education settings we see 
‘teachers’ also engaged as ‘pedagogical researchers’.  A conflict may arise when the teacher 
wishes to use student-learning data, involve students as participants in their research, or 
	
		
31  E.g. Lotte E van Nierop et al., Source of Funding in Experimental Studies of Mobile Phone Use on Health: 
Update of Systematic Review, 11 COMPTES RENDUS PHYSIQUE 622 (2010); Diels et al., supra; Tatiana Lerner 
et al., The Prevalence and Influence of Self-Reported Conflicts of Interest by Editorial Authors of Phase III 
Cancer Trials, 33 CONTEMPORARY CLINICAL TRIALS 1019 (2012); Haris Riaz et al., Conflicts of Interest and 
Outcomes of Cardiovascular Trials, 117 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CARDIOLOGY 858 (2016); Andreas Lundh et 
al., INDUSTRY SPONSORSHIP AND RESEARCH OUTCOME (Report, 2017); Elton Leite et al., Trial Sponsorship 
and Self-Reported Conflicts of Interest in Breast Cancer Radiation Therapy: An Analysis of Prospective Clinical 
Trials, 33 THE BREAST 29 (2017). 
32  Community Based Participatory Research (CBPR) is generally understood as a collaborative approach to re-
search that equitably involves all partners in the research process and in shared decision-making, in recognition 
of partner expertise and the unique strengths of each partner, see Elena Wilson, Amanda Kenny & Virginia 
Dickson-Swift, Ethical Challenges of Community Based Participatory Research: Exploring Researchers’ Expe-
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perhaps also other teaching staff.33Another example is provided by Lunt and Fouché, who 
note the potential conflict when social workers assume the dual roles of ‘social worker 
practitioner’ and ‘practitioner researcher’. 34 This conflict materialises when the social 
worker wishes to undertake their own research and the primary respondents will be clients 
or staff, thereby affecting the practitioner’s relationships. These types of COI may pose a 
challenge to duty of care issues in relation to clients or students, while separate challenges 
will arise in relation to the reporting of results and proper acknowledgement of colleagues’ 
contributions. It may also affect clients’, students’ and colleagues’ ability or willingness to 
exercise their right not to participate in (or to withdraw from) the research without fear 
of negative consequences. Institutions will usually have ethical rules in place to protect 
potential research subjects, but ‘probing research interests’, particularly where vulnerable 
or ‘dependent’ individuals are involved, may tempt researchers to breach their responsi-
bility and do “more-than-least harm” to their subjects.35  
 
This discussion so far has highlighted that research grounded in different disciplinary 
spheres may give rise to certain disciplinary specific potential conflicts of interest which 
may not translate to or equally prevail within other research fields or which may assume 
a different form and with different impact. Accordingly researchers working within dif-
ferent fields of research may not appreciate the full context and culture of potential con-
flicts of interest in other fields or may, based on their own disciplinary context and expe-
rience, misconstrue or misunderstand the ecology that may source potential conflicts of 
interest in other fields and contexts. This points to the imperative for open, ongoing, re-
flective and honest conversations across disciplinary lines to promote mutual understand-
ing of such potential conflicts of interest in different research fields and contexts, and 
thereby enabling such to be interrogated as necessary to avoid the potential bias that 
might otherwise arise. 
 
 
IV. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN PROFESSIONAL CONTEXTS 
 
In this next part of the article I look at the nature of COI in two specific professional 
contexts – first, the medical professional setting and secondly, within the legal profession. 
The purpose of this discussion is to highlight potential differences in the way COI mani-
fest within these different professional contexts and, by analogy, in other professional 
contexts as well. This discussion builds on the first part of the paper to show that different 
	
		
33  Albert F G Leentjens & James L Levenson, Ethical Issues Concerning the Recruitment of University Students 
as Research Subjects, 75 JOURNAL OF PSYCHOSOMATIC RESEARCH 394 (2013); Shirley K Comer, The Ethics 
of Conducting Educational Research on Your Own Students, 13 JOURNAL OF NURSING LAW 100 (2009); Emily 
M Bartholomay & Sarah K Sifers, Student Perception of Pressure in Faculty-Led Research, 50 LEARNING AND 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 302 (2016). 
34  Neil Lunt & Christa Fouché, Practitioner Research, Ethics and Research Governance, 4 ETHICS AND SOCIAL 
WELFARE 219, 227-228 (2010). 
35 Nadia von Benzon & Lorraine van Blerk, Research Relationships and Responsibilities: “Doing” Research with 
“Vulnerable” Participants, SOCIAL & CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 7 (2017) doi: 10.1080/14649365.2017.1346199. 
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disciplinary and professional contexts source different types of conflicts of interest that 
are potentially perceived and understood through quite different lenses depending on a 
person’s intellectual and professional position and training. Accordingly it will infer that 
these differences influence the systems of belief and constructs that varied professionals 
utilise and draw on, when they are called to consider potential conflicts of interest outside 
their specific professional practice or setting. 
 
B. Non-medical Research 
 
For medical professionals, 
 
[t]he primary professional interest of each physician should be “to care for and 
protect the interests and wellbeing of patients to the best of that physician’s abil-
ities, while making sure her or his abilities are maintained as new discoveries are 
made.”36 Physicians assume a variety of roles as they pursue this primary interest, 
for example, patient care, research and innovation, education, guideline develop-
ment, public and population health, administration, policy formulation, or ad-
vocacy. Each of these roles brings with it specific personal secondary interests, 
such as competition for patients and trainees, extramural research funding, or 
high-profile publications, and financial compensation. External relationships 
with for-profit businesses create additional secondary interests, for example, hon-
orarium, royalties, equity, and sponsorship.37 
 
It is clear that COI can variously manifest in the work of a medical professional and in the 
context of medical practice. However, there are two broad obligations and responsibilities 
for the medical professional that I will focus on which may often give rise to potential 
COI - ensuring patient care, and formulating clinical practice guidelines. 
 
1. Anti-corruption campaign 
 
Patients “rely on the independence and trustworthiness of doctors for any advice or treat-
ment offered”.38 There is a fiduciary relationship between doctors and their patients, and 
the presence of COI could influence the practitioner to make decisions which adversely 
impact on patient well-being and outcomes, wastefully increase health care costs, or oth-
erwise contribute to a loss of trust in the health care system.39  
	
		
36  William W Stead, The Complex and Multifaceted Aspects of Conflicts of Interest, 317 JOURNAL OF THE AMER-
ICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 1765 (2017) citing Catherine D DeAngelis, Medical Professionalism, 313 JOUR-
NAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 1837 (2015). 
37  Stead, supra at 1765. 
38  Medical Board of Australia, GOOD MEDICAL PRACTICE: A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR DOCTORS IN AUS-
TRALIA 21 (Mar., 2014), http://www.medicalboard.gov.au/Codes-Guidelines-Policies/Code-of-conduct.aspx. 
39  Christopher Robertson, Susannah Rose & Aaron S Kesselheim, Effect of Financial Relationships on the Be-
haviour of Health Care Professionals: A Review of the Evidence, 3 THE JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE AND 
ETHICS 452 (2012). 
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One well-known source of COI for medical practitioners is links with the pharmaceutical 
industry, which invests billions annually on strategies to influence practitioners’ prescrip-
tion patterns.40 Such strategies include gift-giving, free samples, funding for conference 
travel, funding for conference presentations and continuing education programs, hono-
raria, and marketing in both medical journals and the lay press. It is not only practising 
physicians, but also trainees, which are the subject of these overtures from industry.41 The 
risk for patient care arises when the drug or device being prescribed is either expensive and 
ineffective, or (at worst) unsafe, resulting in the provision of care that is neither econom-
ically efficient nor in the patient’s best interests.42 Similarly, in some jurisdictions such as 
in the US, different fee structures for treating physicians, as well as the availability of self-
referral to physician-owned or –affiliated businesses, can also result in the recommenda-
tion of unnecessary and expensive treatment for the patient.  
 
In addition to the previously discussed human research dimension, medical practitioners’ 
involvement in encouraging and facilitating patient participation in human research, 
where patients may be subjected to unproven and potentially dangerous therapies, is a 
prominent COI issue. The practitioner’s interest is in fulfilling publication requirements, 
clinical service development by obtaining access to new technology prior to competitor 
hospitals, and research program development by generating the income associated with 
study conduct.43 However, in the US and Canada, these secondary interests have led prac-
titioners to “[engage] in excessive ‘enrolment activities’ in exchange for money … [includ-
ing] perpetrated fraud, falsifying their recruitment records in order to increase their prof-
its. Others ignored exclusion criteria designed to ensure the safety of subjects and the va-
lidity of research results, referring their patients to research investigating treatments for 
conditions from which they did not suffer”.44 In such cases of wilful disregard for patient 
health and safety, the practitioners’ breach of their obligations to ensure their patients 
receive the proper care is particularly egregious: 
 
The vulnerability of a doctor’s own patients to become an experimental research 
subject because of their trust in their doctor, combined with the signing bonuses 
which the doctor pockets for the referral, sets up a toxic situation where some 
	
		
40  Neena Chappell et al., Conflict of Interest in Pharmaceutical Policy Research: An Example from Canada, 21 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HEALTH GOVERNANCE 66, 69 (2016); Moses Hamilton III et al., The Anat-
omy of Medical Research: US and International Comparisons 313 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION 174 (2015). 
41  Marissa King & Peter S Bearman, Gifts and Influence: Conflicts of Interest Policies and Prescribing of Psycho-
tropic Medications in the United States, 172 SOCIAL SCIENCE & MEDICINE 153 (2017); Chappell et al, supra at 
69 (2016); Id. at 45; Hampson & Montie, supra. 
42  Robertson, supra.  
43  Aine Donovan & Aaron V Kaplan, Navigating Conflicts of Interest for the Medical Device Entrepreneur, 55 
PROGRESS IN CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASES 316, 318 (2012).  
44  Lemmens & Miller, supra at 132. 
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doctors are literally selling their own patients into human experiments.45 
 
Lemmens and Miller noted another corollary of conflict between practitioners’ financial 
interests and those of their patients in receiving timely medical care.  
 
Particularly when access to care is scarce and waiting lists are significant, finder’s 
fees can greatly exacerbate access issues, overburdening those physicians who 
have chosen not to spend a large proportion of their time recruiting patients and 
filling out forms against considerable payment. The phenomenon raises justice 
concerns, both insofar as the financial interests hamper patient access to care, and 
insofar as the burdens of providing that care may become unequally distributed 




When waiting lists for treatment are long, the prospect of participation in re-
search often becomes a tempting route to care for anxious patients. Physicians 
involved in remunerative recruitment may be tempted to suggest to patients that 
research participation will give them faster access to care. In such circumstances, 
one of the core principles of research ethics is compromised – nearly, that which 
requires research subjects’ consent to participation to be free from undue influ-
ence or coercion. 
 
However, studies into the attitudes of patients and the general public towards practition-
ers’ COIs do not support the position that they universally, or even mostly, consider prac-
titioners’ COI unethical or unfavourable. DiPaola et al. (2014), Yi et al. (2015), and Yi et 
al. (2016) all found that participants were largely unconcerned about connections with 
industry, provided that the practitioner disclosed the conflict to his or her patients; in 
other words, participants considered disclosure the most important means of self-regula-
tion and COI management. 46 Would the public or clients of other professional services 
take a similar view to such conflicts of interest that arise in other professional contexts, 
outside the medical profession? Or do public perceptions about doctors’ COI of them-
selves point to an inherent imbalance in how society views medical professionals and the 
status doctors are accorded, which perhaps evidence a source of potential COI in societal 
relationships with doctors, worthy of greater recognition and recourse? 
 
2. Clinical Practice Guidelines 
	
		
45  Id. at 138, citing U.S., National Institutes of Health, Conference on Human Subject Protection and Financial 
Conflicts of Interest (conference transcript) 45 (2000). 
46  Christian P DiPaola et al., Surgeon-Industry Conflict of Interest: Survey of North Americans’ Opinions Regard-
ing Surgeons Consulting with Industry 14 THE SPINE JOURNAL 584 (2014); Paul H Yi et al., Are Financial 
Conflicts of Interest for the Surgeon a Source of Concern for the Patient?, JOURNAL OF ARTHROPLASTY 
21(2015); Paul H Yi et al., Patient Attitudes Toward Orthopedic Surgeon Ownership of Related Ancillary Busi-
nesses 31 JOURNAL OF ARTHROPLASTY 1635 (2016). 
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The Institute of Medicine defines clinical practice guidelines as “systematically developed 
statements to assist practitioner and patient decisions about appropriate healthcare for 
specific clinical circumstances”.47 Such guidelines “are considered one of the most im-
portant services that medical societies provide. Guidelines serve a unique role to standard-
ize care, define quality of care, and are used in malpractice cases”.48  
 
In the development of clinical practice guidelines, the influence of the intellectual COI of 
committee experts who work on the guidelines have been touted; however, industry also 
helps to define new diseases and determine ‘best practices’ for treating them, usually 
through their connections with the deciding experts.49 Various studies have been con-
ducted on the frequency of COI whether financial or nonfinancial, disclosed or undis-
closed, amongst those on the relevant committees.50 This research underscores that there 
is a strong connection between experts in medical fields highlighting that “[t]he lack of 
disclosure of COI raises significant issues regarding the transparency and validity of the 
guideline development process”51 … and more generally emphasises that “transparency re-
garding any untold influences is critical”.52  
 
B. Non-medical Research 
 
The legal profession has arguably adopted a more clearly defined view of what constitutes 
a conflict of interest than has the medical profession. There is seemingly less interest in 
the legal professional context in distinguishing between different types of COI. This can 
generally be seen in the way that conflicts of interest are described and characterised in 
legal professional conduct rules and other legal professional statements across many juris-
dictions. 
 
Conflicts between the interests of clients, whether current or former, may prevent a law-
yer from acting for one of the parties. In the case of former clients, this proscription 
against acting for a client in conflict with a former client’s interests is mostly concerned 
	
		
47  Lo and Field, supra.  
48  Joseph D Feuerstein et al., Systematic Analysis of the Quality of the Scientific Evidence and Conflicts of Interest 
in Osteoarthritis of the Hip and Knee Practice Guidelines, 45 SEMINARS IN ARTHRITIS AND RHEUMATISM 
379, 382 (2016); see also Lisa Cosgrove et al., Conflict of Interest Policies and Industry Relationships of Guideline 
Development Group Members: A Cross-Sectional Study of Clinical Practice Guidelines for Depression, 24 AC-
COUNTABILITY IN RESEARCH 99 (2017). 
49  Chappell et al., supra at 69; Akl supra. 
50  Susan L Norris et al, Authors’ Specialty and Conflicts of Interest Contribute to Conflicting Guidelines for Screen-
ing Mammography, 65 JOURNAL OF CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 725, 731 (2012); Feuerstein et al., supra; Cos-
grove et al., supra. 
51  Feuerstein et al., supra at 384. 
52  Chappell et al., supra at 69; Akl supra. 
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with protecting their confidentiality, rather than constituting a continuing conflict of in-
terest.53  In large firms, where the former and current clients whose interests are in conflict 
are represented by different lawyers, ‘information barriers’ have been devised as an imper-
fect solution to quarantine information and prevent the former client’s confidentiality 
from being compromised. 54 
 
Beyond these client-centric categories, lawyers have also long been recognised as having 
duties to the profession and society more broadly.55 However, where these duties conflict 
with clients’ interests, “appeals to one or more of these values can often be used to justify 
the violation of another”; specifically, “the importance of client confidentiality, attorney-
client privilege, adherence to the wishes of their client, and the norm of zealous advocacy” 
may be used to override the laws of ethics.56  
 
It has been suggested that legal professionals owe a higher duty of loyalty, including 
greater duties of avoidance and disclosure, than other professional groups. Theories have 
been proposed as to why this is appropriate; writing in the context of the modern Amer-
ican legal system, Witkin wrote: 
 
While doctors are entrusted with their patients' lives and psychologists are en-
trusted with their clients' deepest secrets, legal professionals are unique in that 
they assist one individual who is faced with the collective power of society em-
bodied in the state. The clash between individual rights and such social regula-
tion forges a unique relationship between legal professional and client. Serving 
one person against the collective whole demands a key virtue from legal profes-
sionals: loyalty. … [W]orking in a system of rules that bind and potentially coerce 
the client demands an elevated duty of loyalty from the professional. 
[…] 
[A] system of binding laws poses a variety of practical reasons for its experts to 
promise undivided loyalty to clients. First, people with legal problems may act 
less on their understanding of the complicated structure of laws and procedures 
and more on a sense of fairness that is enhanced through the guidance of a loyal 
advocate. Next, experts in law represent individuals against adverse interests in 
society and must thereby address morally ambiguous situations. The simple ethic 
of loyalty to clients thereby allows legal experts to navigate these subjective di-
lemmas, provide uniform representation as part of a fair and balanced system, 
and rely on the adversarial court system to sort out truth and justice. Finally, the 
	
		
53  YSAIAH ROSS & PETER MACFARLANE, ETHICS, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND LEGAL PRACTICE 
346 (2017). 
54  Id. at 357. 
55  Nathan Witkin, Dependent Advocacy: Alternatives to Independence between Attorneys, 32 OHIO STATE JOUR-
NAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 111, 124 (2017). 
56  Jennifer K Robbennolt, Behavioural Ethics Meets Legal Ethics, 11 ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 75, 78 (2015). 
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promise of loyalty promotes the use and quality of legal services. While the same 
could be said for any service or business, the promise of loyalty is especially im-
portant in the context of binding legal systems because clients may be mistrustful 
of legal experts who work within a system that may exert coercive force over the 
client.57 
 
There have been suggestions that the medical profession could (and should) adopt the 
legal profession’s stricter approach towards outlining and proscribing certain COI. Spe-
cifically, this would involve recognising the “fundamental ethical principle” of loyalty and 
trust between practitioner and patient, and requiring both disclosure and the acquisition 
of informed consent before the practitioner is permitted to pursue the conflicting inter-
est: 
 
Attorneys’ focused conversations about conflict are a far cry from the “disclo-
sures” we find in health care. An oblique reference in a consent form for treat-
ment or research may say “Dr. X’s research is funded by Company Y,” or “Dr. A 
is part owner of this facility and you are free to use the facility of your choice,” or 
“As a prospective patient of Y Medical Center, we are pleased to inform you that 
this hospital is partly owned by physicians.” The patient is virtually never told 
that the ownership represents a conflict of interest, or that the conflict directly 
threatens his or her interests. Neither is he or she asked to provide a special con-
sent expressly for the conflict of interest. 58 
 
At the very least this discussion has highlighted that medical and legal professional ethics 
and duties construct conflicts of interest in ways that give rise to points of divergence. 
This suggests that perhaps medical professionals will view potential conflicts of interest 
in different terms than lawyers; so then, when lawyers and doctors/clinicians are brought 
together on cross-disciplinary committees or boards and asked to make decisions that re-
quire consideration of conflicts of interest there is a real likelihood that they will do so 
from distinctly different points of reference. The implications of this needs careful con-
sideration particularly when one professional voice is likely to dominate or mute the other 
due to unequal representation or influence in any given context. This applies equally to 
other professional groups represented on institutional and organisational cross-discipli-
nary and professional committees and boards. 
 
 
V. POLITICAL CULTURE DIFFERENCE 
 
Conflicts of interest may take a myriad of forms with far reaching potential to impact on 
	
		
57  Witkin, supra at 119–20. 
58  Morreim, supra at 34. 
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professionally related decision-making. This article has highlighted that even highly qual-
ified professionals trained in ethical decision-making and bound by professional ethical 
guidelines and frameworks, may not fully recognise the impact of potential conflicts of 
interest in their activities, particularly when such activities involve decision-making out-
side the confines of their actual professional practice or specific disciplinary context e.g. 
clinicians or legal practitioners who are engaged on institutional ethics committees or 
other organisational committees or boards may unwittingly harbour professional biases 
in their decisions.  
The article has argued that conflicts of interest may indeed be rendered invisible by en-
trenched professional or disciplinary values and cultures that unquestionably accept the 
benevolence and status of a profession, its activities and ethics. Such conflicts of interests 
are arguably further rendered immune to identification and interrogation, as often those 
outside particular professional or disciplinary circles will not understand the nature of 
professional relationships, drivers, incentives and identity. Whilst the value of cross-disci-
plinary and professional committees, panels and boards is obvious, the potential for con-
flicts of interest to unconsciously influence decisions of such entities may be less apparent 
and needs to be vented. The very constituency and perhaps mosaic homogeneity and het-
erogeneity in the character of such groups, may perhaps perversely mask potential con-
flicts of interest and unwittingly reinforce bias in important decision-making, and thereby 
ironically be doing so under the guise of promoting ethical decision making and ethical 
practices. 
 
